Almost seven years on from the Grenfell Tower fire—and more than four years since the first revelations from the Grenfell enquiry—the full report has been released, and its conclusions are universally damning. Failures at every level meant that the risks were either missed or ignored, and even actively concealed to help sell dangerous products.
Although the inquiry has ended, the consequences will resonate for years, with criminal sanctions likely to be on the horizon. So what improvements have been made since the tragedy—and where does this leave building fire safety in the UK?
How we got here
The Grenfell inquiry was divided into two phases. Phase 1, released in October 2019, focused on the timeline of the fire, how it spread, and immediate recommendations to improve building fire safety. Phase 2 examined the underlying issues, including who was responsible for installing the dangerous cladding fitted on Grenfell Tower, and the complex chain of decisions leading to the disaster.
Phase 1 led to significant updates in UK fire safety legislation, such as the Fire Safety Act 2021 and the Building Safety Act 2022. The Fire Safety Act clarified responsibilities for building fire safety, increasing the need for inspections and better communication with local authorities. The Building Safety Act expanded these measures, assigning additional duties to those in charge of fire safety, requiring documentation of fire risk assessments, and creating a new role for high-rise buildings: the accountable person, who must work with others to manage fire and structural safety risks.
Legal changes since Grenfell
These laws addressed some of the gaps that allowed the Grenfell tragedy to occur. However, critics argue that key issues remain unresolved. One significant problem is the plight of residents in other unsafe high-rise buildings, many of whom have been unable to sell their homes or afford the necessary repairs. While the Building Safety Act was eventually amended to protect many from cladding removal costs, it took five years to pass and still doesn’t cover other necessary work, such as replacing faulty fire doors.
Another major concern is how the cladding was installed in the first place, and why it remained in place. The cladding used on Grenfell Tower was already illegal due to its poor fire rating, with tests showing that it posed a significant risk of fire spreading through its core. Yet it was approved, installed, and inspected without recognising or addressing the danger.
Phase 2 of the report highlights these systemic failures. The inquiry concluded that the disaster was “the culmination of decades of failure by central government and others in the construction industry.” The government was criticised for not acting on known risks, while cladding manufacturers were accused of “systematic dishonesty,” including manipulating test results to make their product appear safer than it was.
Addressing underlying fire safety issues
While the updates to fire safety laws were an essential first step, the issues highlighted in Phase 2 are more complex and systemic. Many of the government’s failures were cultural—building safety was delegated to junior officials, and efforts to cut regulatory “red tape” conflicted with the need for stricter oversight. Solving these issues requires time, effort, and a commitment to change that goes beyond legal reform.
There are also structural concerns. While the cladding was the most obvious contributor to the fire, the safety of Grenfell Tower itself came under scrutiny. In addition to faulty fire doors (now addressed by new laws), the building had only one central staircase, no sprinkler system, and a malfunctioning smoke ventilation system—all problems shared with many other high-rise buildings across the UK. These are particularly problematic for elderly or disabled residents on upper floors, a common scenario in council-owned flats.
As planning regulations are relaxed to speed up housing development, it is crucial that the government and local authorities work to raise the bar for fire safety in new buildings. While developers are encouraged to focus on compartmentation—containing fires within individual units—there must be greater awareness of how easily this approach can fail. Without adequate safeguards, a single oversight could allow a fire to spread uncontrollably.
Areas for improvement in fire safety law
One area of debate within the new regulations is the issue of active fire protection systems. While fire alarms and carbon monoxide detectors are mandatory in flats with boilers or other combustion sources, there is no requirement for building- or floor-wide fire alarms. This aligns with the “shelter in place” policy, which suggests that in buildings with a single escape route, it is safer to stay put while the fire is contained than to attempt evacuation.
Sprinkler systems are now required in buildings taller than 11 metres, and high-visibility signage is mandatory. However, there is no minimum fire door rating requirement, with the most common doors providing just 30 minutes of protection. Additionally, most regulations do not apply to buildings under 11 metres tall, with responsible persons only required to fit fire doors that offer “sufficient protection” and meet existing safety standards.
Although these measures are designed to reduce the financial burden on landlords, smaller buildings can still face significant fire safety risks. Inspections of these properties tend to be infrequent, relying on self-reporting rather than enforcement. As a result, some argue that smaller buildings should adhere to stricter standards, such as improved passive fire protection between units and floors or the inclusion of exterior fire escapes for multi-storey structures.
As we will highlight in another upcoming article, fire risk assessments have also still not been properly reformed. There is currently no recommended or standardised qualification for fire risk assessors, meaning that the value of different fire risk assessment courses can vary. The multiplicity of training options and lack of specific guidance means that many fire risk assessors employed by companies are not properly qualified—as happened in the case of Grenfell Tower.
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The only positive of the hideous tragedy at Grenfell Tower is the fire safety legislation that it has led to, and the improvements that will undoubtedly save many lives in the future. Yet so long after the disaster, it’s shocking that so many glaring problems still haven’t been addressed. While high-rises are safer, problems remain, and other areas of fire safety still need to be addressed.
What all of this points to is a general inertia around an area of health & safety that many people consider burdensome. Yet like many safety rules, fire safety law is written in blood. The cost of installing cladding, fire escapes or sprinkler systems is vastly outweighed by the human cost of failing to do so. With luck, the report will lead to further action that rectifies these problems—and ensures we never see a repeat of this disaster.